Mal de Swamp #3

 Inspector General John Roth, who left the position last week, made the case for adequate resources. He noted that, “money can always be used as a weapon to diminish our ability to conduct the active and independent oversight that Congress and the public deserve.” Peter Tyler, POGO, Dec. 4, 2917


Starving the Department of Homeland Security Watchdog During a Time of Growing Challenges
 Peter Tyler
Little discussed during the many major political fights in Washington, DC, is the budget of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) chief watchdog agency. The Senate and House deliberations over the level of resources for the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) exemplifies how Congress must strengthen its oversight efforts.
DHS is well known as the agency that secures the nation’s borders, and is often mentioned in discussions of the President’s proposal to build a wall along the southern border. It handles airport and harbor security, immigration services, national firefighter initiatives, customs and border enforcement, and includes the Coast Guard. The Department’s Federal Emergency Management Agency was kept busy responding to victims of the summer’s hurricane-caused disasters. DHS handles major federal responsibilities, and has 240,000 federal employees and $41 billion in fiscal year 2017 spending with which to do so.
As with other federal Departments, its OIG audits its spending, helps determine the effectiveness of programs, and watches for waste, fraud, and abuse. Its work typically sees a return of investment of almost seventeen dollars for every dollar spent on OIG activities.
Unfortunately, President Trump’s budget proposal of this past spring aimed to slash the DHS OIG’s $175 million budget of fiscal year 2017 to $134 million for 2018, even as he proposed to increase overall DHS spending by $2.8 billion. Some of this increase will go to initiatives that will require the OIG’s attention, such as the controversial step of speeding through the hiring of 15,000 additional border immigration personnel. The OIG will also need to pay attention to bolstered efforts to protect federal computer and data networks.
Then there are this summer’s major hurricanes that struck the United States. During the past few months, Congress allocated tens of billions of dollars in new, unanticipated spending through FEMA, giving the DHS OIG even more work to do as it audits disaster response and recovery spending.
In 2008, Congress made an important change to the laws for OIG budgeting across the federal government. Previously, each IG had to rely on its parent agency and the Administration to communicate its budget needs to Congress. In effect, the IG’s budget could be held hostage to its parent agency. At the time, the Project On Government Oversight advocated for the need to maintain IG independence and require a direct link to Congress. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 included a provision requiring that the budget requests and justifications prepared by the IGs be transmitted directly to Congress. The Administration would also send its proposal and explain any differing views, giving a more complete picture to Congress of the IGs’ spending needs. The IGs therefore have a more equal footing with the Administration in fighting for resources to oversee federal spending.
The result this year? To the credit of the Congressional appropriators, the committees that write the first draft of the budget details, eventually to be adopted by the full Congress, have so far decided to add tens of millions of dollars to the DHS OIG budget proposed by President Trump. Unfortunately, at this point in the appropriations process this is still resulting in a smaller budget for the DHS OIG, with the House appropriations committee proposing $154 million and the Senate $173 million for fiscal year 2018. This year’s DHS OIG budget was $174 million. These numbers seem not to recognize that the overall DHS budget will increase by several billion dollars if the proposals of the House and Senate appropriations committees hold.
And what about the tens of billions in additional spending for disaster recovery approved earlier this year by Congress? Included as part of this year’s disaster spending package was additional funds for DHS OIG to increase its ability to audit and investigate the recovery efforts and the money going out the door. But in a sleight of hand, the appropriators in both the House and Senate just grabbed the additional funds from this year’s disaster spending package and used them as part of the earlier-mentioned levels of DHS OIG spending for next year, thereby not increasing the level of resources for oversight.
In his November Congressional testimony DHS Inspector General John Roth, who left the position last week, made the case for adequate resources. He noted that, “money can always be used as a weapon to diminish our ability to conduct the active and independent oversight that Congress and the public deserve.”
The fight for the DHS OIG budget is not yet over. Congress should take a more sage and sensible approach when it comes to our nation’s homeland security spending. Just as important, the same deliberation over OIG spending is happening across the federal government, from large agencies such as the Department of Defense to smaller such as the Railroad Retirement Board. Our nation’s elected officials should recognize that proper oversight is a critical aspect of government and act accordingly.
By: Peter Tyler
Senior Policy Analyst, POGO
Peter Tyler is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Project On Government Oversight. Peter's areas of expertise are congressional oversight, federal spending accountability, and Inspectors General.

Legality concerns are only part of the problem. Recent history has shown that privatizing intelligence and counterterrorism work can lead to bad outcomes. Contractor linguists played a role in the abuses that took place at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison. There was also the controversy over the CIA paying two contractor psychologists $81 million to devise an interrogation program that yielded very little intelligence and may have violated U.S. law and international human rights treaties. Both instances caused untold damage to the United States’ international standing and may have compromised our national security. -- Neil Gordon, POGO, Dec. 4. 2017

White House Considering Privatized Spy Networks
Neil Gordon
Last week, BuzzFeed News published troubling allegations that the Trump administration is “considering a package of secret proposals” to privatize covert intelligence and counterterrorism operations. According to unnamed sources cited in the article, the proposals involve paying a private security company to set up an intelligence network, run propaganda efforts, and help capture wanted terrorists.
The company, Amyntor Group, is run by U.S. covert ops veterans. Company vice president John Maguire is a former CIA field case officer. Amyntor is based in Whitefish, Montana—a town that has become famous recently thanks to homesteading neo-Nazisand an energy company that won, then lost, a controversial $300 million contract to restore power to Puerto Rico.
The article notes that the Amyntor proposals were pitched to the Trump administration this summer. This was around the same time Erik Prince, the founder of notorious private security firm Blackwater, and Stephen Feinberg, a billionaire financier who owns DynCorp International, were trying to convince the administration to replace U.S. troops in Afghanistan with contractors. At the time, we pointed out that a federal regulation bars contractors from performing inherently governmental functions, or functions that directly impact the government’s discretionary authority, decision-making responsibility, or accountability. The regulation specifically lists directing intelligence operations as an inherently governmental function, which could create legal problems for the administration and Amyntor if the proposals are green-lighted.
Legality concerns are only part of the problem. Recent history has shown that privatizing intelligence and counterterrorism work can lead to bad outcomes. Contractor linguists played a role in the abuses that took place at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison. There was also the controversy over the CIA paying two contractor psychologists $81 million to devise an interrogation program that yielded very little intelligence and may have violated U.S. law and international human rights treaties. Both instances caused untold damage to the United States’ international standing and may have compromised our national security.
Additionally, hiring Amyntor or any other private company could result in a bad deal for taxpayers. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that the intelligence agencies paid contractors 1.66 times what they paid federal employees to perform the same work. The Project On Government Oversight found that contractor language specialists, who are often used to perform intelligence functions, cost taxpayers almost twice as much as government employees. Ensuring Amyntor employees do not perform inherently governmental functions or otherwise violate laws or treaties would require heightened oversight by the government, which only adds to the costs.
The status of the Amyntor deal remains uncertain. An unnamed U.S. government official told BuzzFeed News that the proposals are “absurd” and “not going anywhere.” But the fact remains that contractors are taking on a growing number of governmental functions. Oversight of those contractors must also continually grow to ensure laws are not broken, national security is not undermined, and taxpayers are not ripped off.
By: Neil Gordon
Investigator, POGO
Neil Gordon is an investigator for the Project On Government Oversight. Neil investigates and maintains POGO's Federal Contractor Misconduct Database.


Prince may have revealed part of his strategy in a July 2016 radio interview with Steve Bannon, when he proposed recreating the CIA’s Phoenix Program, an assassination ring used in the Vietnam War, to battle the Islamic State. -- Cole, Scahill, Intercept, Dec. 4, 2017


The Intercept  








Trump White House Weighing Plans For Private Spies To Counter “Deep State” Enemies







Matthew ColeJeremy Scahill

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION is considering a set of proposals developed by Blackwater founder Erik Prince and a retired CIA officer — with assistance from Oliver North, a key figure in the Iran-Contra scandal — to provide CIA Director Mike Pompeo and the White House with a global, private spy network that would circumvent official U.S. intelligence agencies, according to several current and former U.S. intelligence officials and others familiar with the proposals. The sources say the plans have been pitched to the White House as a means of countering “deep state” enemies in the intelligence community seeking to undermine Donald Trump’s presidency.
The creation of such a program raises the possibility that the effort would be used to create an intelligence apparatus to justify the Trump administration’s political agenda.
“Pompeo can’t trust the CIA bureaucracy, so we need to create this thing that reports just directly to him,” said a former senior U.S. intelligence official with firsthand knowledge of the proposals, in describing White House discussions. “It is a direct-action arm, totally off the books,” this person said, meaning the intelligence collected would not be shared with the rest of the CIA or the larger intelligence community. “The whole point is this is supposed to report to the president and Pompeo directly.”
North, who appears frequently on Trump’s favorite TV network, Fox News, was enlisted to help sell the effort to the administration. He was the “ideological leader” brought in to lend credibility, said the former senior intelligence official.
Some of the individuals involved with the proposals secretly met with major Trump donors asking them to help finance operations before any official contracts were signed.

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The proposals would utilize an army of spies with no official cover in several countries deemed “denied areas” for current American intelligence personnel, including North Korea and Iran. The White House has also considered creating a new global rendition unit meant to capture terrorist suspects around the world, as well as a propaganda campaign in the Middle East and Europe to combat Islamic extremism and Iran.
“I can find no evidence that this ever came to the attention of anyone at the NSC or [White House] at all,” wrote Michael N. Anton, a spokesperson for the National Security Council, in an email. “The White House does not and would not support such a proposal.” But a current U.S. intelligence official appeared to contradict that assertion, stating that the various proposals were first pitched at the White House before being delivered to the CIA. The Intercept reached out to several senior officials that sources said had been briefed on the plans by Prince, including Vice President Mike Pence. His spokesperson wrote there was “no record of [Prince] ever having met with or briefed the VP.” North did not respond to a request for comment.
According to two former senior intelligence officials, Pompeo has embraced the plan and lobbied the White House to approve the contract. Asked for comment, a CIA spokesperson said, “You have been provided wildly inaccurate information by people peddling an agenda.”
At the heart of the scheme being considered by the White House are Blackwater founder Erik Prince and his longtime associate, CIA veteran John R. Maguire, who currently works for the intelligence contractor Amyntor Group. Maguire also served on Trump’s transition team. Amyntor’s role was first reported by BuzzFeed News.
Michael Barry, who was recently named NSC senior director for intelligence programs, worked closely with Prince on a CIA assassination program during the Bush administration.
Prince and Maguire deny they are working together. Those assertions, however, are challenged by current and former U.S. officials and Trump donors who say the two men were collaborating.
As with many arrangements in the world of CIA contracting and clandestine operations, details of who is in charge of various proposals are murky by design and change depending on which players are speaking. An Amyntor official said Prince was not “formally linked to any contract proposal by Amyntor.” In an email, Prince rejected the suggestion that he was involved with the proposals. When asked if he has knowledge of this project, Prince replied: “I was/am not part of any of those alleged efforts.”
The former senior intelligence official with direct knowledge of the efforts scoffed at Prince’s denials. “Erik’s proposal had no company names on the slides,” this person said, “but there is no doubt that Prince and Maguire were working together.”
Prince and Maguire have a long professional relationship. Maguire recently completed a stint as a consultant with Prince’s company, Frontier Services Group, a Hong Kong-based security and logistics company partially owned by the Chinese government. FSG has no known connections to the private spy plan.
Prince has strong ties to the Trump administration: His sister Betsy DeVos is secretary of education, he was a major donor to the Trump election campaign, and he advised the transition team on intelligence and defense appointments, as The Intercept has previously reported. Prince has also contributed to Pence’s campaigns.
Maguire spent more than two decades as a paramilitary officer in the CIA, including tours in Central America working with the Contras. He has extensive experience in the Middle East, where he helped plan the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Maguire and Prince met together in September with a senior CIA official at a Virginia restaurant to discuss privatizing the war in Afghanistan.
Prince told a top fundraiser that Maguire was working on part of his Afghanistan plan, characterizing it as the first part of a multi-pronged program. The fundraiser added that Prince never directly asked him for money. But sources close to the project say Maguire did seek private funding for Amyntor’s efforts until a CIA contract materialized. “They’ve been going around asking for a bridge loan to float their operations until the CIA says yes,” said a person who has been briefed on the fundraising efforts.
Beginning last spring and into the summer, Maguire and a group of Amyntor representatives began asking Trump donors to support their intelligence efforts in Afghanistan, the initial piece of what they hoped would be a broader program. Some Trump fundraisers were asked to provide introductions to companies and wealthy clients who would then hire Amyntor for economic intelligence contracts. Maguire explained that some of the profit from those business deals would fund their foreign intelligence collection. Others were asked to give money outright.
“[Maguire] said there were people inside the CIA who joined in the previous eight years [under Obama] and inside the government, and they were failing to give the president the intelligence he needed,” said a person who was pitched by Maguire and other Amyntor personnel. To support his claim, Maguire told at least two people that National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, in coordination with a top official at the National Security Agency, authorized surveillance of Steven Bannon and Trump family members, including Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump. Adding to these unsubstantiated claims, Maguire told the potential donors he also had evidence McMaster used a burner phone to send information gathered through the surveillance to a facility in Cyprus owned by George Soros.
Amyntor employees took potential donors to a suite in the Trump Hotel in Washington, which they claimed was set up to conduct “secure communications.” Some White House staff and Trump campaign supporters came to refer to the suite as “the tinfoil room,” according to one person who visited the suite. This account was confirmed by another source to whom the room was described. “John [Maguire] was certain that the deep state was going to kick the president out of office within a year,” said a person who discussed it with Maguire. “These guys said they were protecting the president.”
Maguire and others at Amyntor have boasted that they have already sent intelligence reports to Pompeo.
PRINCE, MAGUIRE, AND North have long shared a common frustration over the failure of the U.S. government to bring two suspects from a high-profile terrorist event in the 1980s to justice. Last summer, Maguire discussed rendering the suspects with White House officials after learning the men had been located in the Middle East. Despite having no U.S. government approval, associates of Maguire began working on a snatch operation earlier this year, according to a former senior U.S. intelligence official and a former Prince colleague.
Maguire, concerned that the FBI would not take action, made an offer to senior White House officials. The message, according to a person with direct knowledge of the rendition plan, was: “We’re going to go get these guys and bring them to the U.S. Who should we hand them over to?”
The rendition plan was meant to be a demonstration that Maguire and his associates had an active intelligence network and the capability to grab suspects around the world. Prince maintains he has nothing to do with that plan. But according to a source with extensive knowledge of Prince’s networks, Prince was working in parallel to assemble a team to help apprehend the men.
According to two people who have worked extensively with Prince in recent years, Prince has been contacting former Blackwater personnel who worked on a post-9/11 era CIA assassination program targeting Al Qaeda operatives. That program, which the Bush White House prohibited the CIA from disclosing to congressional intelligence committees, was revealed to Congress in 2009 by then-CIA Director Leon Panetta. The CIA says the program did not result in any assassinations.
Among the capabilities Prince offers is a network of deniable assets —  spies, fixers, foreign intelligence agents — spread across the globe that could be used by the White House. “You pick any country in the world Erik’s been in, and it’s there,” said a longtime Prince associate. “They’re a network of very dark individuals.” The associate, who has worked extensively with Prince, then began rattling off places where the private spies and paramilitaries already operate — Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, “all across North Africa.”
Opaque contracting arrangements are typical for Prince, who became a lightning rod in his Blackwater days and now prefers to minimize controversy by operating in the shadows, disguising his involvement in sensitive operations with layers of subcontractors and elaborately crafted legal structures. “That’s his exact MO,” said the longtime Prince associate, adding that Prince consistently attempts to ensure plausible deniability of his role in U.S. and foreign government contracts.
“I have zero to do with any such effort and saying that I did/do would be categorically false,” Prince said in his email to The Intercept. “Knowingly publishing false information exposes you to civil legal action. The only effort I’ve quite publicly pitched is an alternative to Afghanistan.”
THE INTELLIGENCE AND covert action program would mark an unorthodox return to government service for Prince, the onetime CIA contractor who built a mercenary force that became notorious during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would also raise new questions about Prince’s foreign entanglements since he sold Blackwater.
In addition to Prince’s former assassination network, the hidden cadre of spies with no official cover — NOCs in CIA jargon — includes the assets of another key player in the Iran-Contra affair, CIA Officer Duane Clarridge, who died in 2016. Maguire, who worked under Clarridge as a young CIA paramilitary in Central America during the mid-1980s, took over the network of contract spies, who operate mostly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Last summer, as Prince pushed his public proposal to privatize the war in Afghanistan, he and Maguire had broader ambitions, according to a person involved in the discussions. “The goal was to eventually get their network of NOCs worldwide, but they initially started with Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
“Prince seems to be firing on a lot of cylinders and pitching overt and covert plans,” said a current intelligence officer who has closely monitored Prince’s career and been briefed on several of Prince’s recent efforts, including the proposals to Pompeo. The official declined to discuss details of the plans but pointed to Prince’s much-discussed pitch to privatize the war in Afghanistan as a smokescreen for offering other more controversial programs and operations.
Prince’s Afghanistan plan, which received substantial media attention and got a hearing at the highest levels of the Trump administration, “was brilliant because it changed the narrative and made him relevant,” the officer said, referring to Prince’s scandal- and investigation-plagued career at Blackwater. The officer also added that the very public Afghanistan pitch, replete with cable news interviews and op-eds, provided a legitimate reason “to justify meeting with people” at the White House, CIA, or other government agencies.
“Erik has no hobbies,” said the longtime Prince associate. “Counterterrorism is his hobby.”
In some ways, these plans mirror operations Prince led during the Bush-Cheney administration. When Prince was running Blackwater, he and a former CIA paramilitary officer, Enrique Prado, set up a global network of foreign operatives, offering their “deniability” as a “big plus” for potential Blackwater customers, according to internal company communications obtained by The Intercept.
In a 2007 email, with the subject “Possible Opportunity in DEA—READ AND DELETE,” Prado sought to pitch the network to the Drug Enforcement Administration, bragging that Blackwater had developed “a rapidly growing, worldwide network of folks that can do everything from surveillance to ground truth to disruption operations.” He added, “These are all foreign nationals (except for a few cases where US persons are the conduit but no longer ‘play’ on the street), so deniability is built in and should be a big plus.”
The longtime Prince associate said that the nexus of deniable assets has never gone away. “The NOC network is already there. It already exists for the better part of 15 years now,” he said.
Prince has long admired North and viewed his role in Iran-Contra as heroic, said the Prince associate. In 2007, Prince testified defiantly before Congress following the Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad, in which Blackwater operatives gunned down 17 Iraqi civilians, including women and children. Shortly after his testimony, Prince’s longtime friend, conservative California Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, praised the Blackwater chief. “Prince,” Rohrabacher said, “is on his way to being an American hero just like Ollie North was.”
North, a Marine lieutenant colonel on the Reagan National Security Council, oversaw a scheme to divert proceeds from illicit arms sales to Iran to Contra death squads in Nicaragua. The resulting scandal became known as the Iran-Contra affair, and North was convicted of three felonies, though these convictions were later thrown out.
Both North and Maguire attended a small reception in 2014 celebrating Prince’s third marriage — to his former spokesperson Stacy DeLuke. “It was an intimate affair,” said the Prince associate. “Only Erik’s closest friends were invited to that reception.” On election night in 2016, DeLuke posted photos on social media from inside Trump headquarters.
On November 30, Prince testified behind closed doors before the House Intelligence Committee about his January trip to the Seychelles to meet with Mohammad bin Zayed, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, and a Russian fund manager close to Vladimir Putin. According to the Washington Post, Prince presented himself as an unofficial envoy of President-elect Trump. The Intercept reported last week that the fund manager was Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund. Prince repeatedly said that he did not remember the identity of the Russian, but on Thursday, in testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, Prince admitted that he did in fact meet with Dmitriev.
Prince may have revealed part of his strategy in a July 2016 radio interview with Steve Bannon, when he proposed recreating the CIA’s Phoenix Program, an assassination ring used in the Vietnam War, to battle the Islamic State. Prince said in the interview that the program would be used to kill or capture “the funders of Islamic terror, the wealthy radical Islamist billionaires funding it from the Middle East.”